Uncaused Beginnings by Oppy, Graham
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 27 Issue 1 Article 4 
1-1-2010 
Uncaused Beginnings 
Graham Oppy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Oppy, Graham (2010) "Uncaused Beginnings," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers: Vol. 27 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol27/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 27 No. 1 January 2010 61
All rights reserved
UNCAUSED BEGINNINGS
Graham Oppy
I defend the view that it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state 
under the causal relation even though it is impossible for any other (non-
overlapping) parts of reality to have no cause. I claim that, while there are 
good theoretical and commonsense grounds for maintaining that it is sim-
ply not possible for non-initial parts of reality to have no cause, these good 
grounds do not require one to claim that it is impossible that reality has an 
uncaused initial state.
There are many possible models for the causal shape of reality. Amongst the 
simple models to be considered—even if only to be subsequently rejected 
as models of real possibilities—we should certainly mention: REGRESS, 
CIRCLE, NECESSARY INITIAL STATE, and CONTINGENT INITIAL 
STATE.1 (According to REGRESS, each state of reality is preceded by some 
other state of reality under the causal relation. According to CIRCLE, the 
states of reality form a circle under the causal relation. According to NEC-
ESSARY INITIAL STATE, there is an initial state that is prior to all other 
states under the ancestral of the causal relation, and it is necessarily the 
case that there is an initial state of this kind under the causal relation. Ac-
cording to CONTINGENT INITIAL STATE, there is an initial state that is 
prior to all other states under the ancestral of the causal relation, but it is 
only contingently the case that there is an initial state of this kind under 
the causal relation.)
Each of these simple models admits of both theistic and naturalistic 
interpretations. It is widely recognised that in several of these cases—
REGRESS, CIRCLE, CONTINGENT INITIAL STATE—naturalism would 
be preferable to theism: if reality had the causal shape in question, then 
there would be good—albeit defeasible—reason to accept naturalism and 
to reject theism.
I think that naturalism is preferable to theism even in the case of NEC-
ESSARY INITIAL STATE. Consequently, I think that considerations about 
the causal shape of reality provide grounds for naturalism: for I judge that, 
on any of the most plausible causal shapes that might be taken by reality, 
naturalism is more plausible than theism. Of course, these judgments of 
1NECESSARY INITIAL STATE and CONTINGENT INITIAL STATE come in different 
sub-varieties, depending upon the number of possible initial states that are countenanced 
(one or many).
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mine are highly controversial; however, what seems less controversial is 
that the grounds for naturalism are strengthened if the models on which 
naturalism is clearly preferable to theism remain in play.
In this paper, I shall be examining an argument for the claim that CON-
TINGENT INITIAL STATE is not a model that should be kept in play. This 
argument runs as follows.
1. If it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under the 
causal relation—i.e. it is possible for reality to have a contingent ini-
tial state that has no cause—then it is possible for other (non-over-
lapping) parts of reality to have no cause. (Premise)
2. It is not possible for other (non-overlapping) parts of reality to have 
no cause. (Premise)
3. (Hence) It is not possible for reality to have a contingent initial state 
that has no cause. (From 1, 2)
This argument is my reconstruction of an argument, found in the writings 
of William Lane Craig2, which he claims has antecedents in the work of 
Jonathon Edwards3 and Arthur Prior4. While it may be that this is not the 
best possible reconstruction of Craig’s argument, that will not matter for 
present purposes, since my main aim here is to investigate the first prem-
ise of this argument, and, in particular, to explore potential naturalistic 
objections to it. I take it that Craig clearly commits himself to this first 
premise, and that Edwards and Prior do likewise; further investigation of 
exactly who argues what and how can be left to some other occasion.
1
If naturalists are to deny the first premise of the argument, then a natural 
first thought is that they will claim something like this: a contingent initial 
state of reality and the contingent things that feature therein are the only kinds of 
thing that can have no cause. That is, it is necessary that non-initial states of 
reality, and all of the contingent things that feature therein that did not fea-
ture in the initial state of reality, have causes. In other words: anything that 
comes into existence, other than the contingent initial state of reality and 
all of the contingently existing things that feature therein, has a cause.
If naturalists are to endorse this claim, then it seems to me to be plau-
sible to suppose that they will also endorse the following claims: first, that 
anything that is or can be a contingent initial state of reality cannot be anything 
other than a contingent initial state of reality; and, second, anything that is or 
2“Professor Mackie and the Kalām Cosmological Argument,” Religious Studies 20 (1985), p. 
371n3; “God, Creation and Mr. Davies,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (1986), 
pp. 167–168; “The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe,” Truth 3 (1991), p. 87; 
and “Graham Oppy on the Kalām Cosmological Argument,” Sophia 32 (1993), p. 7.
3A Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will which 
is Supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and 
Blame Boston, 1754  http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/works1.iii.html.
4“Limited Determinism,” Review of Metaphysics 16.1 (1962), pp. 55–61
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can be a non-initial state of reality cannot be anything other than a non-initial 
state of reality. In other words: the properties of being initial and non-initial 
states of reality are essential properties of states of reality. (And likewise 
for the contingent things that features in states: something that features in 
a contingent initial state of reality can only come into existence as a fea-
ture of a contingent initial state of reality; and something that comes into 
existence as a feature of a non-initial state of reality can only come into 
existence as a feature of a non-initial state of reality.5)
Among the questions that Craig poses to proponents of CONTINGENT 
INITIAL STATE, there are the following two: first, if you deny that it is 
possible for a raging tiger to ‘suddenly come into existence uncaused out 
of nothing’ in the room in which you are reading this article, how can you 
allow that it is possible for the initial state of reality to ‘suddenly come 
into existence uncaused out of nothing’?; and, second, if you suppose that 
it is possible for the initial state of reality to ‘suddenly come into existence 
uncaused out of nothing,’ how can you deny that it might have been hy-
drogen atoms or rabbits that ‘sprang spontaneously from the void’?
The theses sketched above suggest a clear answer to both of these ques-
tions. The enunciated causal principle tells us that it is possible for the ini-
tial state of reality to have no cause; and, in conjunction with the subsidiary 
principles about essential properties of states of reality and things that fea-
ture therein, it also tells us that it is impossible for a raging tiger to pop into 
existence uncaused here and now (at least given the further uncontrover-
sial assumption that tigers have come into existence as features of non-ini-
tial states of reality). Moreover, in conjunction with those same subsidiary 
principles about essential properties of states of reality, the causal principle 
also entails that hydrogen atoms and rabbits could not have come into ex-
istence as features of the initial state of reality (at least given the further 
uncontroversial assumption that hydrogen atoms and rabbits have come 
into existence as features of non-initial states of reality).
2
Craig—following the lead of Edwards and Prior—has a response to the 
proposal developed in the previous section. The naturalist cannot seri-
ously maintain that kinds of things that come into existence as features of 
non-initial states of reality cannot come into existence as features of initial 
states of reality because prior to their coming into existence, things do not 
have natures that could control their coming to be. If it were possible for some 
kinds of things to be features of contingent initial states of reality, then it 
would have to be possible for any kinds of things to be features of contin-
gent initial states of reality, since there is nothing prior to the coming into 
existence of those contingent initial states of reality to place constraints on 
their nature and features.
5These principles might, in turn, be taken to derive from theses about the necessity of 
causal origin; however, I do not propose to explore this suggestion here.
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I don’t think that this response is satisfactory. Consider, for example, 
Craig’s suggestion that, if we suppose that the contingent initial state of 
reality had no cause, we are obliged to allow that it might have been a 
rabbit ‘that popped uncaused out of the void.’ If it were really possible 
that a rabbit might have ‘popped uncaused out of the void,’ then it would 
have to be possible for there to be nothing other than a rabbit in existence. 
But, I think, it is manifestly impossible for the initial state of reality to be 
exhausted by the state of a single rabbit. Rabbits are not kinds of things 
that are capable of that kind of lonely existence.6 On the contrary, rabbits 
can only exist as part of larger networks of related entities. (It is also true 
that rabbits necessarily have a particular kind of causal ancestry; however, 
it would suffice for Craig’s purposes if the initial state of reality could be 
exhausted by a single rabbit ‘duplicate.’ So this point can be accommodat-
ed by appropriate adjustments in Craig’s claim.) Moreover, what goes for 
rabbits goes for almost all of the things that we see around us: all of those 
things can only exist as parts of larger networks of related entities.
The general point here is that there is a good sense in which natures 
do constrain ‘initial’ coming into existence: the initial state of reality has 
to be the kind of thing that can exist even though there is nothing else in 
existence; and the things that feature in the initial state of reality have to be 
kinds of things that can exist as parts of an initial state of reality. If there are 
very few possible initial states of reality—and if there are very few kinds 
of things that can feature in initial states of reality—then Craig, Edwards 
and Prior are just mistaken. The lesson here seems clear: our naturalist 
could insist that there are very few possible contingent initial states of real-
ity (perhaps even, as we’ll see in the next section, no more than one); and 
our naturalist could also insist that there are very few possible things that 
could have featured in initial states of reality. One consequence of the latter 
assumption will be that very few of the things that now exist could have 
featured in initial states of reality: that consequence will certainly suffice 
to answer more general versions of Craig’s question about whether rabbits 
and hydrogen atoms might have ‘sprung spontaneously from the void.’
3
Even if it is granted that the various assumptions that we have offered 
to naturalists would suffice to defeat the argument that we are consider-
ing, there are clearly further questions about motivation and plausibility 
that remain to be addressed. Are there deeper metaphysical claims that 
might be taken to motivate acceptance of the claims that we have offered 
to naturalists? In particular, are there plausible views about modality 
6In the present context, it would be manifestly irrelevant to object that there are good 
senses in which it is conceivable or imaginable that the initial state of reality is exhausted 
by a single rabbit. In those senses, it is also conceivable or imaginable that something might 
‘pop into existence in my room uncaused out of nothing.’ Craig insists on a sense of ‘real’ 
possibility that is not contradicted by those kinds of conceivability or imaginability; I simply 
follow his lead.
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and causation that could be taken to underwrite the rejection of the iden-
tified premise?
The modal case is perhaps easier, so let’s start with that. Here’s a very 
brief sketch of a candidate theory of real (alethic) modality. There is an 
alethically possible world in which there isn’t anything causal. All other 
alethically possible worlds have the same initial state as the actual world, 
and differ from the actual world only insofar as objectively chancy pro-
cesses have different outcomes. Because objective chance is ubiquitous, 
there are many alethically possible worlds. Some might want to allow 
more worlds: for instance, alethically possible worlds that have different 
initial states, or alethically possible worlds in which there are differences 
in the evolution of states due to factors other than objective chance. How-
ever, the view that I am outlining here does not accept this relaxed aus-
terity: those other worlds might be, say, doxastically or merely logically 
possible, but that’s not enough to establish real alethic possibility.7
Now for causation. The key thought here is that causation is the glue 
that unifies reality: what makes a given non-initial state a state of reality is 
that it is causally consequent upon earlier states of reality. Moreover, what 
makes some non-initial thing that features in a state of reality a part of 
reality is that it is causally consequent upon things that featured in earlier 
states of reality. (Given this way of talking, it is at least a doxastic pos-
sibility that, in the actual world, there are independent realities: causal 
networks between which there is no causal interaction. But, of course, in 
that case, I would use the word ‘reality’ to refer to the causal network in 
which we are embedded. And, in any case, on the view that I’m develop-
ing, the claim in question is only a doxastic possibility.) Given the account 
of modality—with its acceptance of objective chance—there is some sense 
in which this view denies that causation is deterministic; however this 
account leaves it open whether causation should be analysed in terms 
of probabilities, or counterfactuals, or networks, or INUS conditions, or 
transfers of conserved quantities, or whether causation should be treated 
as a theoretical primitive.
It seems to me to be plausible to claim that these views about causa-
tion and real (alethic) modality provide support for the various principles 
7As Tom Flint pointed out to me, there are many other variants of the simple view pro-
posed in the text. One might think, for example, that there are many really (alethically) pos-
sible worlds that consist of a single material simple; and one might think that there are many 
really (alethically) possible worlds that consist of two causally unrelated material simples; 
and one might think that there are many really (alethically) possible worlds that consist of 
three causally unrelated material simples; and so forth. I take it that the simple view pro-
posed in the text provides a minimal commitment for my naturalists: however real (alethic) 
possibility is disposed, these things are among the real (alethic) possibilities. Whether more 
than this is really (alethically) possible is something about which my naturalists might rea-
sonably be uncertain: outright belief in the simple view might rely upon giving too much 
weight to considerations about theoretical simplicity. On the other hand, the simple view 
also has the advantage that it clearly conforms to the thought that the actual is the ground 
of the possible: it isn’t clear that the way that the world is gives my naturalists any reason to 
think that more is really (alethically) possible than is allowed by the simple view.
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that were offered to naturalists as a way of objecting to the first premise 
in the target argument. Given this view of alethic modality, there is only 
one possible initial state for reality, but it is a contingent matter whether 
that initial state obtains. Moreover, given the role that causation plays as 
the ‘glue’ that unifies reality, it is at least natural to suppose that, on these 
views, the properties of being initial and non-initial states of reality will be 
essential properties of states of reality, and that the contingent initial state 
of reality and the contingent things that feature therein are the only kinds 
of thing that can have no cause. And so forth.
Of course, what has been offered here is, at best, a very rough sketch. 
But it seems to me that, at the very least, it suffices to show that, until you 
explore the range of possible naturalistically acceptable accounts of mo-
dality, causation, and so forth, you cannot be in a good position to assert—
as Craig does—that if one holds that it is possible for something (an ini-
tial contingent state of the universe) to come into existence uncaused out 
of nothing, then one is simply unable to explain why there are no other 
things that do or can come into existence uncaused out of nothing.8
4
So far, this discussion has proceeded at a very high level of abstraction, 
thereby avoiding questions about the nature and extent of natural reality. 
(Is natural reality exhausted by something rather like a single big bang 
universe; or is natural reality comprised of something rather like a large 
collection of big bang universes, causally related to one another through 
singularities, or wormholes, or some such? Is natural reality universally 
spatio-temporal, or are there some parts of natural reality that are ‘framed’ 
by other kinds of external relations? Where reality is spatio-temporal, is 
it the case that causal priority and temporal priority are everywhere per-
fectly aligned? Etc.) However, it is worth asking whether, if we descend 
from these heights and focus on well-established features of the part of 
reality that we inhabit, we might be able to construct a plausible case, for 
the claim that it is impossible for a raging tiger to ‘suddenly come into 
existence uncaused out of nothing’ in the room in which you are read-
ing this article, that is pretty obviously independent of assumptions about 
whether it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under the 
causal relation. In this discussion, I take it for granted that, at least at the 
macroscopic level, temporal order and causal order coincide in the part of 
reality that we inhabit.
8Of course, naturalists can ask Craig how he proposes to explain why there are (and can 
be) no non-initial things that come into existence uncaused out of nothing. True enough, the 
causal principle that he accepts—that nothing can come into existence uncaused—entails the 
claim to be explained. But it is clear that the causal principle that we are here investigating—
that no non-initial thing can come into existence uncaused—also entails the claim to be ex-
plained. As far as explanatory credentials go, the two cases seem to be on a par. Before we 
can make any further comparison of the merits of theistic and naturalistic explanations of the 
claim, we also need to have some properly elaborated theistic theories on the table!
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Suppose that there is a table in the room in which you are reading this 
article. Is it possible that a tiger ‘come into existence uncaused out of noth-
ing’ where that table is? I don’t think so. I assume that it is just impossible 
for the table and the tiger to simultaneously occupy the same spatial loca-
tion: if there is to be a tiger where the table now is, then it cannot be that 
the table also continues to be there. Thus, in the causal order, before the 
tiger can come to occupy a spatial location that overlaps with the cur-
rent spatial location of the table, the table must cease to occupy that loca-
tion. Moreover, it cannot just be the coming into existence of the tiger that 
brings it about that the table ceases to occupy that location: non-existent 
things do not have causal powers, and the tiger does not begin to exist 
until it occupies some spatial location or other. However, if that’s right, 
then I think that we should say that the table’s ceasing to occupy the loca-
tion that it currently occupies is a cause of the coming into existence of the 
tiger (given that the tiger comes into existence where the table now is). 
But, if the table’s ceasing to occupy the location that it currently occupies 
is a cause of the coming into existence of the tiger, then it isn’t true that the 
tiger ‘comes into existence uncaused out of nothing.’
If this line of thought is plausible, then it generalises. Pick any tiger-
shaped space in the room. In order for a tiger to occupy that tiger-shaped 
space, that space must have appropriate internal and boundary proper-
ties: there are, after all, lots of ways that the boundary and interior of that 
space could be that are simply inconsistent with the occupation of that 
space by a tiger. But, if that’s right, then it seems to me that we should al-
low that the consistency of the boundary and interior of the space with oc-
cupation by a tiger—or, more strictly, the coming about of the consistency 
of the boundary and interior of the space with occupation by a tiger—is 
a cause of the coming into existence of the tiger. And, as before, if this is a 
cause of the coming into existence of the tiger, then it is isn’t true that the 
tiger ‘comes into existence uncaused out of nothing.’
Might one object that, if the table’s ceasing to occupy the location that it 
currently occupies—or the coming about of the consistency of the bound-
ary and interior of the space with occupation by a tiger—itself has no 
cause, then we would have a situation in which the tiger ‘comes into exis-
tence uncaused out of nothing’? I don’t think so. Compare with a situation 
in which there are several causes of an explosion: the presence of oxygen, 
the presence of gas, the lighting of a match, and so forth. If we suppose 
that one of these factors—say, the presence of oxygen—has no cause, that 
seems to make no difference to its status as a cause of the explosion, nor 
to the status of the claim that the explosion had a cause. Even if there is 
no cause of the table’s ceasing to occupy the location that it currently oc-
cupies, it will still be the case that the table’s ceasing to occupy the location 
that it currently occupies is a cause of the coming into existence of the ti-
ger; even if there is no cause of the coming about of the consistency of the 
boundary and interior of the space with occupation by a tiger, it will still 
be the case that the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and 
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interior of the space with occupation by a tiger is a cause of the coming 
into existence of the tiger.
Might one object that it is a mistake to suppose that, in the imagined 
circumstances, the table’s ceasing to occupy the location that it currently 
occupies—or the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and 
interior of the space with occupation by a tiger—is a cause of the com-
ing into existence of the tiger? Again, I don’t think so. Compare with the 
case of the explosion: nearly everyone accepts that it is right to say that 
the presence of oxygen, the presence of gas, the lighting of the match, 
and so forth, are all causes of the explosion. But the role of the table’s 
ceasing to occupy the location that it currently occupies—or the role of 
the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and interior of the 
space with occupation by a tiger—in the coming into existence of the 
tiger seems to be on all fours with, say, the role of the presence of oxygen 
in the explosion.9
Might one object that it is a mistake to suppose that, in the imagined cir-
cumstances, the table must cease to occupy its current location before the 
tiger can come to occupy a spatial location that overlaps with that current 
spatial location of the table, on the grounds that there could be an uncaused 
instantaneous reorganisation of the constituents of the table in which they 
become the constituents of a tiger? I don’t think so. On the one hand, it 
seems to me that there are goods grounds for thinking that it is not re-
ally possible that mere instantaneous rearrangement of constituents could 
transform a table into a tiger (or, at any rate, a tiger ‘duplicate’)10. On the 
other hand—and more importantly—I take it that, even if there could be 
an uncaused instantaneous reorganisation of the constituents of the table 
in which they become the constituents of a tiger, that would not be a case 
in which a tiger came into existence ‘uncaused out of nothing.’ Rather, that 
would be a case in which a tiger came into existence ‘uncaused out of the 
constituents of a table’—and so it would not be a counterexample to the 
claim that it is impossible that a tiger ‘come into existence uncaused out of 
nothing’ where the table is.
9Perhaps it is worth noting that we can make the same kind of point in cases in which 
we’re inclined to judge that there is just one salient cause. Consider a case in which a sta-
tionary billiard ball starts to move because it is struck by another moving ball. Suppose that 
this is a case in which we’re disposed to say that the cause of the movement of the hitherto 
stationary ball is the collision with the moving ball. If we suppose that the moving ball has 
‘popped into existence out of nothing’ just prior to its collision with the stationary ball, that 
supposition seems to have no effect at all on our judgment that the collision with the moving 
ball is the cause of the motion of the hitherto stationary ball.
10Remember: we’re following Craig’s lead, distinguishing carefully between real possi-
bilities and logical possibilities. You might think that it is logically possible that the constitu-
ents of a table be instantaneously reorganised to form a tiger; but even if you do think that, 
you’d need further reason to suppose that this is a real possibility. (Suppose that we adopt 
the theory of alethic modality described in section 3. I reckon that in the set of worlds that 
have the same origin as ours, and which differ from ours only in the outcomes of objectively 
chancy processes, there isn’t even one world in which the constituents of a table are instan-
taneously reorganised to make a tiger. So, on that account of alethic modality, I reckon that 
such instantaneous reorganisation is not a real possibility.)
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Might one object that it cannot be right to claim that it is impossible for 
a tiger to suddenly come to occupy a tiger-shaped location in the room 
in which you are reading this article on the grounds that quantum me-
chanics makes provision for just these kinds of sudden appearances? I 
don’t think so. It may be so that there are various mechanisms embraced 
by contemporary physics that could bring it about that a tiger suddenly 
appeared in the room in which you are reading this article where there 
was no tiger beforehand—quantum tunnelling, travel through space-time 
wormholes, etc. However, if such things are really possible, they are cer-
tainly not cases in which a tiger ‘comes into existence uncaused out of 
nothing,’ since they are one and all causal processes. If a tiger quantum 
tunnels into the room from somewhere else, then that plainly isn’t a case 
in which a tiger ‘comes into existence uncaused out of nothing’; likewise 
for a tiger that is transported into the room via a space-time wormhole. 
(While it is strictly irrelevant to the present argument, it might be worth 
noting that, even if this kind of quantum tunnelling were possible, we 
could explain why we’ve never observed a case of it involving macro-
scopic objects: such events are so massively improbable that there is vir-
tually no chance of a single event of this kind in a volume the size of the 
observed universe over a time period longer than the currently estimated 
age of the observed universe.)
Might one object that it cannot be right to claim that it is impossible for 
a tiger to suddenly come to occupy a tiger-shaped location in the room in 
which you are reading this article on the grounds that a special T-singu-
larity might appear and then rapidly expand to become a tiger?11 I don’t 
think so. On the one hand, there is surely good reason to deny that this 
is a real possibility: perhaps you can make a mental picture of such an 
occurrence, but why should you suppose that that picture corresponds 
to something that might really happen? On the other hand—and more 
importantly—even if the T-singularity ‘comes into existence uncaused out 
of nothing,’ this would not be a case in which a tiger came into existence 
uncaused out of nothing, since it is clearly being supposed that the expan-
sion of the T-singularity is a causal process, and that the existence of a 
tiger is the end-product of that causal process.
Might one object that most of the observable universe consists of spac-
es whose interior and boundary conditions are consistent with occupa-
tion by a tiger—i.e., that almost every tiger-shaped space in the universe 
is actually consistent with occupation by a tiger? Put more vividly: might 
one object that it is surely the case that the Apollo astronauts ought to 
have been no less certain that tigers would not pop into existence around 
them as they winged their way to the moon! Certainly not. Of course, I 
agree that the Apollo astronauts ought to have been no less certain that 
tigers would not pop into existence around them as they winged their 
11I am grateful to Peter Forrest and Greg Restall for being causes of the inclusion of this 
paragraph in my paper.
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way to the moon. But nothing in the preceding argument requires the 
assumption that the coming about of the consistency of the boundary 
and interior of a tiger-shaped space with occupation by a tiger might 
be the sole cause of the coming into existence of a tiger in that space. 
On the contrary, the argument has only been for the conclusion that—in 
the room in which you are reading this paper—the coming about of the 
consistency of the boundary and interior of a tiger-shaped space with oc-
cupation by a tiger would be a cause in any ‘popping into existence’ of a 
tiger in that space.12 (I suppose that, if it were so that almost every tiger-
shaped space in the universe is consistent with occupation by a tiger, it 
would still be the case that the coming about of the consistency of the 
boundary and interior of a typical tiger-shaped space with occupation 
by a tiger would be a cause of the ‘popping into existence’ of a tiger in 
that space13: causal factors do not cease to be causal merely because they 
are nearly ubiquitous.)14
Again, what I have provided here is no more than an incomplete sketch. 
But, again, it seems to me that, at the very least, it suffices to show that, 
until you have explored the prospects for direct arguments on behalf of 
the claim that it is impossible for a raging tiger to ‘suddenly come into ex-
istence uncaused out of nothing’ in the room in which you are reading this 
article, you cannot be in a good position to assert—as Craig does—that if 
one holds that it is possible for something [an initial contingent state of 
the universe] to come into existence uncaused out of nothing, then one 
is simply unable to explain why there are no other things that do or can 
come into existence uncaused out of nothing.
12Of course, it hardly needs pointing out that, if a tiger arrives in the room by a causal 
process that plainly ought not to be called ‘popping into existence’—e.g., if a tiger wanders in 
through the door—then the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and interior of 
the tiger-shaped space that is actually occupied by the tiger with occupation by a tiger is not 
a cause of the presence of the tiger in that space. In cases in which it would be appropriate to 
talk about ‘popping into existence,’ the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and 
interior of the tiger-shaped space with occupation by a tiger must be causally prior to—and 
hence causally independent of—the existence of the tiger. But in other cases—as when a tiger 
walks into the room—the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and interior of 
the tiger-shaped space with occupation by a tiger is causally dependent upon—and hence 
not causally prior to—the existence and presence of the tiger.
13I suspect that it is false that almost every tiger-shaped space in the universe is consistent 
with occupation by a tiger—even in interstellar and intergalactic space, tiger-shaped spaces 
are typically inconsistent with (immediate) occupation by tigers. However, nothing in my 
argument rests on whether this suspicion is correct.
14I think that a minimum requirement for the real possibility of the ‘popping into existence’ 
of tigers in tiger-shaped spaces would be a distribution of objective chances for the ‘popping 
into existence’ of tigers over those tiger-shaped spaces. However, if there were a distribution 
of objective chances for the ‘popping into existence’ of tigers over those tiger-shaped spaces, 
then—a fortiori—there would be further (probabilistic) causes of the existence of any tigers 
that came into existence in this objectively chancy way. Moreover, it seems to me that my 
naturalists could suppose either that it is really impossible for there to be any such distribu-
tion of objective chances over tiger-shaped spaces, or else that, on any really possible distribu-
tion of objective chances, the chance that a tiger ‘pop into existence’ in a tiger-shaped space 
is vanishingly small. But nothing in my main argument turns upon whether the speculations 
introduced in the current footnote are correct.
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In this paper, I have conducted a rough preliminary investigation of the 
claim that, if it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state un-
der the causal relation—i.e. if it is possible for reality to have a contingent 
initial state that has no cause—then it is possible for other parts of reality 
to have no cause.
I have suggested that there are various grounds—theoretical and com-
monsensical—for maintaining that it is simply not possible for non-initial 
parts of reality to have no cause; and I have also claimed that these grounds 
are pretty clearly consistent with the claim that it is possible for reality 
to have a contingent initial state under the causal relation. Of course, I 
don’t claim to have provided an exhaustive investigation of grounds of 
this kind; there may well be many other ways in which one could argue 
for the same conclusion.15
Because this investigation is rough and preliminary, it may have gone 
wrong in various ways. However, even if that is so, it may still be that 
the main aim of the paper is achieved: for the points that I most want to 
emphasise are (i) that it is possible for naturalists to engage in this kind of 
metaphysical theorising, and (ii) that there can be no justified assessment 
of the theoretical merits of the products of such theorising that doesn’t 
look at the details of the theories in question. It isn’t possible to assess the 
merits of theories until those theories have been constructed and tabled; 
in particular—despite Craig’s implicit suggestion to the contrary—it isn’t 
possible to make justified claims about what certain types of theories can 
and cannot explain until you have the relevant theories in hand.16
Monash University
15Here is a sketch of a different line of thought. An initial state of reality establishes a 
‘frame’ for external relations: space, time, and the like. Once this ‘frame’ is established, it is 
impossible for another ‘frame’ of external relations to be embedded within it. Consequently, 
an initial state of reality is—and must be—utterly different in kind from any non-initial state 
of reality. Moreover, this clear difference extends to the causal properties of reality. On the 
one hand, it is obvious a priori that an initial state of reality has no cause. On the other hand, 
it is a plausible metaphysical speculation that the ‘evolution’ of the ‘frame’ of reality is, and 
must be, causal. Development of this line of thought will need to await some other occa-
sion.
16I read this paper at the inaugural APRA (Australasian Philosophy of Religion Associa-
tion) conference in Canberra on September 28, 2008. Thanks to all of those who participated 
in the conference, and, in particular, to all of those who engaged in discussion of my paper. 
Special thanks to Tom Flint, Peter Forrest, Greg Restall, and two anonymous referees, for 
very helpful questions and comments.
